Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the driving force behind Iran's nuclear program and the most vocal of Israel's enemies, is on his last legs as president. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has stripped him of most of his powers and shut the door against his having any political future.
debkafile's Iranian sources report his loyalists have been deserting him in droves since he went to New York to deliver an address to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 23. The Supreme Leader used his absence for the coup de grace: The removal of the president's loyalists from the list of 4,000 contenders running for seats in parliament (the Majlis) next March.

That was easily arranged: Khameini handed his orders to Ayatollah Mohammad Kani, head of the Assembly of Experts, which In the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for screening all contenders for office. He was told to disqualify all the president's associates. So, in the next Majlis, Ahmadinejad will be shorn of a loyal faction and any buddies sticking to him when his second presidential term runs out in May 2013 will be out of a job.

The Supreme Ruler degraded the president very publicly with one humiliation after another.

He waited for Ahmadinejad to go on the air in a US NBC interview on Sept. 13 to promise the release of Josh Fattal and Shane Bauer, the two American hikers convicted of spying, before cutting him down by suspending their release until the Iranian president was being booed by protesters in New York for reneging on his promise.
Tehran's political, religious and military insiders were not surprised by his downfall, our Iranian sources report. For some time he had been getting too big for his boots, accumulating more powers than any president before him and only getting away with it so long as he was Khamenei's fair-haired boy.

But then, the favorite, whose election in 2005 and reelection in 2009, Khamenei engineered at the cost of violent anti-government protests in Tehran, rewarded him with ingratitude. He increasingly flouted the master and in some cases began chipping away at his authority - until Khamenei had had enough and decided to reel him in.

At the last minute, he cancelled a live Ahmadinejad interview on Iran's second television network wide publicized for the eve of his departure to the United Nations.
The affronts followed him home to Tehran, where waiting for him were serious criminal charges linking his name to the disappearance of three billion dollars from Iranian banks. The name of the embezzler has not been released but our sources in Tehran reveal him as Amir Mansour Arya, an entrepreneur who started a business five years ago with Ahmadinejad’s encouragement and whose fortune grew a thousand fold within a suspiciously short time.
Arya is accused of using his presidential connections to secure multi-billion dollar loans from Iranian banks and then spiriting large sums out of the country.

Ahmadinejad denies any complicity in the crime. He tried fighting back by threatening to publish within 15 days "dozens of names" of rivals he claims are guilty of financial crimes. The deadline came and went without publication.

The betting in Tehran is that the Supreme Leader will not actually sack Ahmadinejad but let him last out his term as yesterday's man,  lame duck in political isolation.
debkafile's Iranian sources: Two frontrunners for future president most mentioned recently are two hardliners, Majils (legislature) Speaker Ali Larijani, a former senior nuclear negotiator with the West, and ex-foreign minister Ali Akhbar Veliyati, who is a member of Khamenei's kitchen cabinet as senior adviser on international relations.

As the Palestinian-Arabs and their friends make their latest push for "Palestinian" statehood at the United Nations this week, once again the wrong questions are being asked, while the pertinent questions every reporter, activist, and foreign minister should be asking never arise.

Why do "Palestinians" need a state of their own?  Who are these "stateless" people?  What is their history?  Where have they been for all of these years?

In the spirit of "you don't know what you don't know," here are some Hansel-and-Gretel-like bread crumbs to guide journalists and others to the questions they might ask:

Where does the name "Palestine" come from and who have been the people who've lived there?  Of course, it was coined by the conquering Romans to add insult to injury to a Jewish nation they sought to obliterate.  The Romans conquered the land, but there was always a remnant of Jewish people living there. 

While throughout the ages the land was under control of various powers, none called themselves "Palestinian," and there was never a nation with that name.  It was that Jewish remnant and those Jews who joined them over time who became the "Palestinians."

In modern times, the Ottoman Turks controlled this territory and, following World War I, the British (under the auspices of the League of Nations).  In this period, there were many "Palestinian" institutions, though all of them were Jewish in character and membership.  The most famous of these was, perhaps, the Palestine Post, which lives on today as the Jerusalem Post.  There were Palestine orchestras and chess teams and the like.  But the names of the players were Jewish, not Arab.

As Jewish nationalism in the region gained strength, the Arabs and Muslims committed massacre after massacre of Jews throughout Palestine.

Meanwhile, in 1922, the British took 78% of territory that was promised for a Jewish homeland by the World War I victors and the League of Nations and gave it to the Arabs.  The outcome was the heretofore nonexistent Arab nation of Transjordan.  Transjordan later became simply Jordan.

This should be the end of the story, as the land of Palestine was divided (though quite unfairly) and an Arab state was created out of the Jewish homeland.  "Two states for two peoples."

Being handed 78% of a territory would satisfy most people -- if their true interest were a state of their own.  Instead, over the past seven decades, what the world refuses to see is the desire by the Arabs to obliterate Jewish nationalism, and later the Jewish nation that was its culmination.

Violence and terrorism by the Arabs against Jews continued, and as the Arabs stepped up their pressure on the British and the League of Nations, in an attempt to appease the Arabs, the remaining 22% of the land left for the Jews was divided further.  The Arabs again got the bigger portion.  The Jews accepted the offer and, when the mandate expired, declared independence as the nation of Israel.

The Arabs declared war.

Though they were unable to defeat the Israelis, the Arabs did gain more territory.  The Jordanians expanded into what they renamed "the West Bank" so as to erase the Jewish connection to Judea and Samaria (as those areas were called for millennia), while Egypt grabbed the Gaza Strip.

The Arabs who lived in those areas never cried out for independence or claimed to be oppressed, nor threatened to go to the United Nations.  Why?  Because they were part of, rather than distinct from, the Arab Nation.

Instead, there were incessant terror attacks.  In 1964, the Arabs formed the "Palestine Liberation Organization" -- three years before Israel would gain control over the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria (aka "the West Bank").  So: what were the Arabs bent on liberating, and whom were they liberating it from?  Did they demand a state from Egypt and Jordan?  This is the same PLO that today controls the Palestinian Authority -- and has never renounced its appetite for all of what was once dubbed "Palestine."

It was only after Israel's miraculous victory in 1967 that "the West Bank" and "Gaza Strip" suddenly had relevance to their Arab inhabitants, and it was then that the Arab propaganda machine revved up.  It eventually inverted much of the world's perception of the Middle East: transforming tiny Israel from its natural role of "David" against the massive Arab population and lands, to one of "Goliath" against the "stateless," "oppressed," and "occupied" "Palestinians."  It made the notion of changing straw into gold seem like child's play.  And it worked.

That the Palestinian-Arabs have spilled much innocent blood to get their "cause" out there -- murdered Olympics athletes, airline passengers, bus riders, diners -- seems to have faded from memory.  But it was these headline-grabbing crimes that got them to the head of the line.

The lesson: crime pays.  Terror works.

So, journalists, activists, and foreign ministers of the world: you still have time to ask yourselves and others these questions; still have time to prevent a great wrong from being done; still have time to save untold lives; still have time to avoid a terrible precedent; still have time to prevent the creation of another terrorist state.  Will you?

Steve Feldman is executive director of the Greater Philadelphia District of the Zionist Organization of America and was a reporter for more than 20 years.

The U.S. State Department has some new pro-active policies toward Muslims and other minorities in Europe that seem to mark a salient change. For example, Charles Rivkin isn't your traditional American ambassador in Paris: a political appointee with a career background in entertainment, he is regularly spotted doing things like this: hosting hip-hop artists and ethnic-minority politicians at embassy receptions; inaugurating a large art mural in Villiers-le-Bel, the site of major urban riots in 2007; visiting a youth cultural center and engaging in debates with the audience; dropping in on embassy-sponsored seminars on social issues and engines of change; or surprising French high school students by bringing along Hollywood star Samuel L. Jackson for a discussion about his growing up in the segregated American South. These are but a few of the initiatives taken by the Obama envoy. Since taking up his post in summer 2009, Rivkin has pursued a vigorous public effort to connect with the poorer, multiracial suburbs of major French cities.  Les banlieues, as they are called in French, have become a code word for largely-unassimilated, mainly Muslim immigrant communities.  Too often feeling ignored or mishandled by local authorities, by the central government and by mainstream political parties, these marginalized groups often become resentful, socially explosive sources of the ethnic tensions that roil France. Now the U.S. government is trying to help France defuse these changes by providing encouragement and real-life models for minority activists to learn how to use American techniques and help their communities succeed, integrate and -- who knows? -- perhaps one day lead their nations.

In what amounts to a significant but largely unreported shift in U.S. diplomacy, embassies are broadening their traditional focus on national elites and established leaders in politics, trade-unions and the like, and expanding the mix to include under-represented minorities. In France, this new focus has been dubbed by Rivkin as a “Minority Engagement Strategy” aimed at helping potential leaders in the Muslim banlieues learn the tools of U.S.-style democratic change. Part of this outreach (and its political acceptability) is that it includes mainstream French leaders, hoping to raise consciousness in their ranks about the advantages of overcoming social exclusion and promoting real diversity and not just pay lip service to the notion of it.  This new U.S. approach is now being applied in many democratic countries (and in some, notably in the Middle East, that aspire to be democratic) – an effort to walk the walk that goes with the pro-democracy talk of public diplomacy emanating from Washington.

Nowhere is this departure more emblematic than in France, where it seems to be succeeding thanks to the way in which U.S. practice on assimilation of minorities seems to overlap with French rhetoric on diversity and equal opportunity for all citizens. Tellingly, in France and elsewhere, as the U.S. works on bringing this new dimension of minority outreach, the State Department has changed the representation in many of its major foreign programs – for instance, the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). Marking its 70^th anniversary this year, this program has changed the composition of it intake of visitor, shifting from its traditional recruitment among established elites (several recent French presidents including the current incumbent were youthful beneficiaries of the program) and now targeting promising young people from Muslim and other minority communities. Nowadays they – and no longer just the traditional elites – are accepted for each foreign country’s carefully-selected contingent of promising younger citizens to visit relevant places in the U.S.  Over the years, this program has brought more than 4,000 foreigners on these smartly-guided tours of different facets of American life.  Now – and especially since the election of President Barack Obama -- the demographics of the program are radically changing with an influx of youthful or young professional “outsiders” that the U.S. embassy considers “promising” in their own communities and perhaps eventually on a larger, even national stage. (As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recently noted, many of the leaders of the Egyptian movement that overthrew the old regime in Egypt had “benefited from the visitation program” – by which she meant the State Department’s IVLP outreach and training.)  The idea is to expose these guests, first hand, to U.S. political practices that have fostered democratic change and social integration instead the ghetto-ization and raw confrontation that minorities have often faced in France.

This new focus is summed up in a passage from a U.S. embassy-Paris cable recently published by Wikileaks:

“We will continue and expand our efforts to bring minority leaders from the U.S. to France, working with these American leaders to convey an honest sense of their experience to French minority and non-minority leaders alike. When we send French leaders to America, we will include, as often as possible, a component of their trip that focuses on equal opportunity. In the Embassy, we will continue to invite a broad spectrum of French society to our events, and avoid, as appropriate, hosting white-only events, or minority-only events. We will be inclusive, working in this way to break down barriers, facilitate communication, and expand networks. By bringing together groups who would not otherwise interact together, the Embassy will continue to use its cachet to create networking opportunities that cut through traditional cultural and social barriers in France.”

The French case is particularly interesting because the France has traditionally been wary any “U.S. influence” liable to infiltrate the nation. But the current innovation in U.S. outreach seems to enjoy a benign reception and even encouragement in Paris both in government and in the Muslim community. In fact, this American policy seems to be benefiting from an astute analysis in Paris of domestic political imperatives in a globalizing world, and also from deft U.S. diplomatic management. Part of this U.S. policy is to track future movers and shakers – just as it has always done and is now trying to do in new and different less-established circles.  The program goes beyond “talent-scouting and wooing” to include a more ambitious, grass-roots effort aimed at actively encouraging leaders of minorities in France and in other countries across Europe and seeking to help them learn more about how to take full advantage of the potential for democratic change in their societies. Indeed, in many ways this U.S. move could have been modeled on Obama’s career as a “community organizer” among minorities in Chicago. In fact, it was the Bush administration that started the idea of trying to export some of the American experience of minority integration to other countries in Europe and the Middle East: now it is touted in Washington as part of the tool kit of “smart power” as advocated by Mrs. Clinton to creatively promote transatlantic cooperation and American diplomatic interests.

France, with its five to six million Muslims (an estimated one-tenth of the population) is obviously an important test case for this newer form of outreach. “Diversity” in France has been official dogma that in practice is often largely ignored. Perhaps because the current French government is aware of this contradiction, the U.S. embassy has made no secret of its work: officials have relied on “an annual public affairs budget of $3 million” to sponsor or fund a large number of small-scale programs, including “urban renewal projects, music festivals and conferences.” They have “formed a network of partnerships with local governments, advocacy groups, entrepreneurs, students and cultural leaders in the troubled immigrant enclaves outside France’s major cities” – to coach them, support them and encourage them – with a view to turning cultural outsiders and social rebels into part of broadening French national elite. Just how direly restricted the current French elite can appear, not only to Americans but also to French leaders themselves, emerges from another passage in the Wikileaks cable from U.S. embassy-Paris:

“France has long championed human rights and the rule of law, both at home and abroad, and justifiably perceives itself as a historic leader among democratic nations. This history and self-perception will serve us well as we implement the strategy outlined here, in which we press France toward a fuller application of the democratic values it espouses. This strategy is necessary because French institutions have not proven themselves flexible enough to adjust to the country's increasingly heterodox demography. Very few minorities hold leadership positions in France's public institutions…as a mirror of the crisis of representation in France, the National Assembly, among its 577 deputies, has a single black member from metropolitan France (excluding its island territories), but does not have any elected representatives of Muslim or Arab extraction, though this minority group alone represents approximately 10 percent of the population. The Senate has two Muslim Senators (out of 343), but no black representatives and only a few Senators hail from other ethnic or religious minorities. Sabeg also noted that none of France's approximately 180 Ambassadors is black, and only one is of North African descent.”

With this approach, the U.S. embassy has built up what is sometimes said to be one of the best networks and contacts with minorities in civil society. One prominent young Muslim leader from a Paris suburb told Le Monde newspaper that he felt “better known in Washington than in downtown Paris.” Thus, in June 2010, the embassy co-sponsored a seminar for French participants on how to help minorities build a political base. For two days, Karen Finney, a communication strategist for the Democratic Party, and Cornell Belcher, who had worked as a pollster for the Democratic Party, coached seventy local elected representatives and members of associations on how to communicate, fund and manage a political campaign

The desire to involve a more diverse audience is particularly strong in the realm of people-to-people diplomacy, especially trips to the U.S. that are organized, funded or facilitated by the embassy in Paris. Beyond the prestigious IVLP professional exchange effort (whose alumni include President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon), U.S. officials have also encouraged smaller endeavors, such as partially financing the trip for eight young hip hop artists as part of a musical exchange program in Harlem; or by taking care of logistics for Reda Didi, founder and head of the think tank Graines de France that seeks to help minority politicians. Didi had been invited, along with other colleagues, to come to Chicago by William Burns, now an Illinois State Senator and a former deputy campaign manager of Barack Obama, to learn more about community organizing.

Updating traditional policies of outreach did not happen overnight, instead it came about in response to a number of key factors. Even before 2000, according to Judith Baroudy, the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs of the Paris embassy, American officials believed that they were not getting a full picture of France, and that it could not just rely on the traditional interlocutors. They understood that French society was evolving, and that they needed to reach out to all citizens, notably those from les banlieues. The major urban riots in 2005 and in 2007 served to validate this perspective and to encourage the embassy to track the evolution of the poorer suburbs more closely. By many accounts, it has done an excellent job doing so. “I am always amazed by the quality of the information collected by the embassy, despite operating with limited means,” explains Luc Bronner, journalist at Le Monde.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11 brought sharp attention in the U.S. to the threat of potential terrorism coming from les banlieues – or by extension from the ranks of 15 million Muslims living in Europe. Washington felt that their situation could no longer be ignored by the U.S. and its embassies. Counter-terrorist officials worried, at first, that the U.S. could be vulnerable to the threat of radicals with European passports coming to commit attacks: many Europeans could visit freely thanks to the visa-waiver program. In this view, France deserved special attention because it has the largest Muslim population in Europe. Subsequently, the emphasis in American diplomacy evolved and broadened into an effort at building bridges with the Muslim world, echoing the cooperative attitude suggested by President Obama’s speech in Cairo in 2009. American embassies in Europe were instructed to be open to Muslims, to court second- and third-generation immigrants, and to reach out to minorities for whom America had too often, as one official said, been reduced to an aggressive image and “become a voodoo doll”  to be attacked for everything that goes wrong for Muslims and Arabs.

The need to build ties with Muslims and minorities took an urgent turn in the case of France after the searing split between Paris and Washington over the Iraq war. The conflict led to the rise of anti-American sentiments in the country, and a pervading feeling within les banlieues that the U.S. was at war with the Muslim world. Connecting more with France’s diversity thus came under the normal purview of public diplomacy, seeking to dissipate misunderstandings and misinformation, and to improve the image of the U.S. abroad. The outreach – and notably the trips – seem to be succeeding in allowing French opinion leaders (now including those in minorities) to discover that the U.S. as a  “country is more complex than a media cliché,” according to JustinVaïsse, a French senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Undoubtedly, the diplomacy of influence and outreach pursued by American embassies throughout Europe became more pronounced with the arrival of the Obama administration. Not only did his election significantly improve perceptions of the U.S. in Europe, the image of a first African-American president also profoundly affected minorities’ attitudes, including in France. It acted both as a source of immense pride and a mirror to the frustrations they faced in their own countries. American officials in Europe are keen to help, and to share the lessons from their country’s difficult experience with race relations and civil rights. They want, according to Deborah MacLean, public diplomacy officer at the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, to “encourage these [minority] youths to realize that it is okay to be different.”

In this new U.S. push, the outreach to encourage diversity – spurred by the evolution of French society, the threat of terrorism and U.S. public diplomacy – U.S. diplomats seem convinced that the French elites will inevitably change to be more inclusive, that those currently on the periphery of the system will become influential tomorrow, according to sources cited by journalist Luc Bronner in an article in Le Monde. Moreover, according to Bronner and to Reda Didi, the embassy -- by providing a psychological boost and recognition to these movers and shakers, who often feel neglected by their own authorities -- is hoping that it will favor in the long-run the emergence of leaders who will act as counter-weights to any radical discourse.

Unsurprisingly, the American message of hope has not always proven to everyone’s liking, nor has it always received good coverage in the French press. Thus, an article in the Paris tabloid Le Parisien warned about the risk that perhaps the CIA was infiltrating the suburbs. The embassy outreach also received some unwanted but apparently undamaging attention when the Wikileaks disclosures brought to light cables on the Minority Program, including the one cited above. Officials from the Paris embassy, for their part, downplay any hidden agenda or even threatening undertones that might be imputed to their outreach program, to correct misperceptions and respond to criticisms. They emphasize that they are careful to avoid doing anything that could embarrass French authorities.  Quite the contrary, they are partnering with French officials and organizations in their outreach efforts and emphasizing that they are working with all of France.

Summing up, this outreach program in France and elsewhere seems to be succeeding so far as smart and inexpensive people-to-people diplomacy that the French government finds helpful for its own ambitions and also promotes transatlantic cooperation, including among Muslims and other minorities. The U.S. investment seems to show, according to Vaïsse, an optimistic view of French society -- that it can and will be able to overcome the challenges of integration. It is noteworthy that this U.S. program continues to promote the value of prizing minorities as a real potential asset for a democratic society at a time when President Sarkozy – together with Germany’s Angela Merkel and Britain’s David Cameron – have been publicly sounding a death knell for multiculturalism as a part of their nations’ social contracts.

 

Garret Martin is an Editor at Large for European Affairs 

Old but interesting - the Wikileaks cables are a good source on this as well.

WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is considering a military trial in the United States for a Hezbollah commander now detained in Iraq, U.S. counterterrorism officials said, previewing a potential prosecution strategy that has failed before but may offer a solution to a difficult legal problem for the government.

While the U.S. hasn't made a decision, officials said a tribunal at a U.S. military base may be the best way to deal with Ali Mussa Daqduq, who was captured in Iraq in 2007. He has been linked to the Iranian government and a brazen raid in which four American soldiers were abducted and killed in the Iraqi holy city of Karbala in 2007.

No military commission has been held on U.S. soil since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. President George W. Bush tried holding a few suspected terrorists at military bases inside the U.S., but each detainee ultimately was released or transferred to civilian courts.

President Barack Obama has said that, because of changes to the military commissions that give prisoners more rights, he supports them as an option in the fight against terrorism. Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group that the U.S. has branded a terrorist organization.

But a tribunal for Daqduq probably would draw criticism from both liberals, who say a civilian court should be used, and conservatives, who don't want suspected terrorists brought to the U.S. regardless of the venue.

The officials who discussed the deliberations spoke on condition of anonymity because no decision has been made.

The Bush administration had planned to prosecute Daqduq in an American civilian court. To prepare for that, intelligence officials questioned Daqduq, then had the FBI restart the interrogation from scratch so his answers would be admissible in court.

In a twist of political irony, however, that plan has been effectively scuttled because of opposition from Bush's own Republican Party.

A decision must be made soon. Daqduq is among a few of the remaining U.S. prisoners who, under a 2008 agreement between Washington and Baghdad, must be transferred to Iraqi custody by the end of 2011. U.S. officials fear that if he is turned over to Iraq, he will simply walk free.

Palestinian Statehood Deepens Saudi-U.S. Split – Analysis

By Ali Huseyin Bakir

On September 23, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas asked the United Nations for recognition of a Palestinian state within 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital. Abbas handed U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon a letter requesting full U.N. membership, which the Security Council must consider. While Israelis totally refuse this step, the U.S. administration threatened to veto any attempt to go to the Security Council on the pretext that this unilateral step does not help achieve the goals that all parties aspire to or help achieve peace in the region.

Why to Go to the United Nations?

To Palestinians and Arabs, Israel didn’t leave them any choice but to go to the (SC), because they made all the concessions that might be envisaged to achieve peace even without having any guarantees, and negotiations with Israel have still been going on for decades without success or real progress. This is mainly because the Israelis refuse to commit to a clear and specific program for the negotiations with a time table, not to mention that they did not commit or implement any of the previous agreements originally reached with the Palestinians, in addition to the international resolutions issued by the United Nations and the Security Council.

Without achieving any progress, the unconditional U.S. support for Tel Aviv, the failure of America to play the role of honest broker, and the inability of successive U.S. administrations to force Israel to fulfill its obligations or to pressure her to stop its illegal, illegitimate acts such as occupation and settlement construction, it was necessary to go to the United Nations to demand the recognition of a Palestinian state and put its responsibilities toward the world ahead of Israel.

In these circumstances, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas considers the Security Council option to demand recognition of an independent Palestinian state as an obligation, especially as there are three other reasons which prompted the Palestinian leadership to take such a decision, namely:

1 – U.S. President Barack Obama did announce in a speech at the United Nations in September 2010 that he want to see the state gain a new full membership in the United Nations in September 2011.

2 – The international Quartet had announced that it was necessary to start negotiations last September and to end them in September 2011, and reconfirmed that in its meeting held in Munich in early February 2011.

3 – We (Palestinians) have pledged that there will be active institutions able to lead the country in September, and we have succeeded in that.

What would be the Result if Independent Palestinian State was Recognized?

According to the Arab point of view, the international recognition of an independent Palestinian state within the territories of 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, will correct the track of the negotiations set before in Oslo, the direction and the goal of these negotiations will become clear as will the time table.

In addition, this recognition will correct the imbalance with Israel so that the negotiations will come to be between two independent states, will break the Israeli intransigence, and provide a legal status to the Palestinian state.

Although the announcement and recognition may not lead to a fast change on ground right now, mainly because of the Israeli occupation and the presence of the illegal settlements, but without a doubt it will lead to a change in the rules of the game and bound Israel to its responsibilities and international obligations, which entails other legal effects.

Moreover, this step will provide the opportunity to push toward serious negotiations and force Israel to fulfill its obligations or face the legal and political implications of escaping. It will open the door wide for the accountability of Israel and prosecution for its violations, and may allow the Palestinians to file a complaint before the International Criminal Tribunal against the illegal settlements.

The Arab League’s Position

In spite of the U.S. threat to veto the file if presented to the Security Council, the Arab League is leading the move to support the declaration of a Palestinian state. The follow-up committee of the Arab League’s Arab Peace Initiative had previously announced that it had taken the necessary steps to enlist the support required for the recognition of the Palestinian state. It affirmed that the option of a just and comprehensive peace with Israel will not be achieved unless Israel fully withdraws from occupied Arab territories to the lines of June 4, 1967, an independent state of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital is established, and a just and agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue is reached.

This effort combined with the Palestinian National Authority effort lead by president Mahmoud Abbas up until August 2011 has resulted in the recognition by 123 countries out of 193 in the world of Palestine as an independent state, which means only six more countries are needed to ensure two-thirds of the possible votes if the file is presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations instead of the Security Council.

Saudi Warnings Towards U.S. Veto

Saudi Arabia warned recently the U.S. of the consequences if it decides to veto the issue. In his article published in the New York Times under the title “Veto a State, Lose an Ally,” former director of Saudi intelligence and a former Saudi ambassador to United States “Turki al-Faisal” wrote: “The Obama administration has had ample opportunities to lead Israelis and Palestinians into bilateral peace talks, but American policy makers have unfortunately been more preoccupied with a deteriorating domestic economy and a paralyzed political scene than with finding a workable solution to this epic injustice. Because Washington has offered no viable new proposals, the least it can do is step aside and not hinder Saudi, European and moderate Arab efforts to advance Palestinian rights at the United Nations,” adding that “Saudi Arabia would no longer be able to cooperate with America in the same way it historically has… Saudi leaders would be forced by domestic and regional pressures to adopt a far more independent and assertive foreign policy. Like our recent military support for Bahrain’s monarchy, which America opposed, Saudi Arabia would pursue other policies at odds with those of the United States, including opposing the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq and refusing to open an embassy there despite American pressure to do so. The Saudi government might part ways with Washington in Afghanistan and Yemen as well.”

Background of the Saudi Stance Towards U.S.

There is no doubt that the firm stance from Saudi Arabia towards the U.S. administration comes within the context of internal and regional accounts that the KSA and Arab region are witnessing right now. The Saudi support for the Palestinians in this period is not an exception; it falls within the historical context of the long process of helping the Palestinians restore their legitimate rights.

It is true that financial support was most notable as Saudi Arabia had earmarked over $2.5 billion in aid to the Palestinian Authority since June 2009, making it by far the largest single supporter of the Palestinian cause. We must not forget that the current Saudi King Abdullah was the one who launched the generous 2002 Arab Peace Plan when he was crown prince, offering peace and a normalization of relations between Israel and all the Arab states in return for restoring Arab lands Israel occupied after 1967.

Saudi Arabia, which brought together all the Arab states in this initiative, was kind of humiliated when Israel cornered itself by rudely refusing this initiative and responded to it by launching wars against Lebanon and Palestine, seizing more Palestinian land and building more illegal settlements to try to change realities on ground. Washington did not even bother to make any real effort to pressure Israel not to evade the offer (or to accept the offer).That is not taking the initiative.

This behavior by Israel continued prompting King Abdullah to reassure in 2009 in the Arab League Summit held in Kuwait that Israel must realize that the choice between war and peace will be open all the time, and that the Arab peace initiative on the table today will not remain on the table forever.

Taking into consideration the misguided U.S. policies during all those years, Saudis are worried that the U.S. administration will continue this same path. Although Turki Al Faisal doesn’t currently occupy any official position, the current official Saudi stance is not far from what he had expressed.

Because Egypt is suffering from instability right now and needs time to recover and restore its power and regional influence, Iraq is under the strong influence of Tehran and Syria’s foreign policy has been paralyzed since it first witnessed an uprising. Saudi Arabia is the only Arab state left that is still effective, if not the most effective, on the regional front.

In this sense, Saudi Arabia is facing the burden of the regional instability created by the Arab revolutions. At the same time, it bears the consequences of the regional geopolitical competition in the Arab region which flared up recently between Iran, Turkey, Israel, and America, in conjunction with facing internal challenges and numerous regional threats, especially those coming from Iran.

There is a general impression among decision-making circles in Riyadh that the Americans are so naïve and often follow wrong policies in the region, leaving their allies to bear the consequences of these misguided policies, especially after 2001. They invaded Afghanistan in 2001, entering a clash with Islam under the title of the War on Terror, they occupied Iraq in 2003 to bring democracy but they brought us chaos, and instead of addressing the problem of Iran, they have increased Tehran’s influence in the region and allowed it to expand its presence in the Arab arena through their misguided policies. Now, the Americans are repeating the same mistake by mismanaging the current situation in the light of new realities amid the Arab revolutions.

As former Saudi Arabia government advisor “Nawaf Obaid” put it in one of his articles:”For more than 60 years, Saudi Arabia has been bound by an unwritten bargain: oil for security. Riyadh has often protested but ultimately acquiesced to what it saw as misguided U.S. policies. But American missteps in the region since Sept. 11, an ill-conceived response to the Arab protest movements and an unconscionable refusal to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlement building have brought this arrangement to an end. As the Saudis recalibrate the partnership, Riyadh intends to pursue a much more assertive foreign policy, at times conflicting with American interests.”

The recent events, in particular against the backdrop of Iranian meddling in a number of Arab countries from Palestine to Lebanon via Iraq and Yemen, not to mention Bahrain, have shown that Washington is a partner who cannot be relied upon, and is either unwilling or unable to cope with the Iranian threats. Instead of curbing Tehran, the counterproductive U.S policies during all these years have amplified the Iranian power in the region.

As for the issue of Israel, experience shows that the U.S. is weak and useless in the face of Tel Aviv, and unwilling in the context of its unconditional support offered to Israel to exercise any real pressure on it to push for the implementation of its obligations. Even when it comes to the issue of settlements, which is easier to discuss and the illegality of which Washington recognizes, the U.S. administration not only could not force the ban on Tel Aviv, but also vetoed the draft resolution proposed by the Arab group to condemn Israeli settlement in the occupied Palestinian territories last February 2011.

Accordingly, Washington has failed to resolve any outstanding issues in the region during at least the last decade. In addition, the U.S. no longer the global “super power” it was in the 1990s. As it suffers from serious problems at various levels of political, economic, and military issues, its power is in decline and it is rapidly losing influence in many regions including the Middle East. This has led Washington to lose its prestige, as its allies do not trust it due to its volatile positions and the cost of its approved policies, and opponents do not fear it or its threats.

Saudi Arabia, U.S., and New Realities

Taking all this into consideration, the United States has become a burden on its friends in the region, especially with the outbreak of the Arab revolutions. As prince Turki Al Faisal put it “Saudi Arabia would no longer be able to cooperate with America in the same way it historically has. With most of the Arab world in upheaval, the ‘special relationship’ between Saudi Arabia and the United States would increasingly be seen as toxic by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, who demand justice for the Palestinian people.”

Ignoring the new realities in the Arab world brought by the Arab revolutions, and instead of adopting a policy of “damage control” while the region witnesses increased tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, or increased public Arab anger toward Israel after the killing of five Egyptian soldiers resulted in a break-in of the Israeli embassy in Cairo, the United States is on the contrary heading toward associating itself with Israel. Washington is not even taking neutral stance, it insists on the open and unconditional support of Israel without any reasonable cause to justify it, risking U.S. interests in the Arab world and with Muslims.

In the past, it was possible for the Arab regimes to absorb the anger of the public toward misguided U.S. policies and the unconditional support for Israel, but today—while Arab people can fire and hire governments—this is no longer possible. Since people will blame the KSA for being an ally of America, Saudi Arabia does not intend to risk and endure the consequences of angry Arabs to please Washington. If the U.S. wants to ignore the Saudi advice and supports Israel against Palestinian rights, it has to bear alone the subsequent consequences.

Not to mention that Riyadh will no longer be able to stand idle watching its strategic regional interests eroded and Iran’s influence growing to swallow Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen. As former Saudi government adviser Nawaf Obaid said four months ago:”Saudi Arabia has the will and the means to meet its expanded global responsibilities. In some issues, the Saudis will continue to be a strong U.S. partner. In areas in which Saudi national security or strategic interests are at stake, the kingdom will pursue its own agenda… there is simply too much at stake for the kingdom to rely on a security policy written in Washington, which has backfired more often than not and spread instability.”

Possible Implications of a U.S. Veto

In one of his latest T.V. interviews, foreign-policy expert and former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski said “U.S. veto (against a Palestinian state) will not only be a strategic error, but will be a tragic historical error.”

• It is expected that Washington will face public backlash from an angry Arab public. The U.S. will lose what is left of its credibility in the people’s eyes in the Arab and Islamic world. A U.S. veto will be seen as a policy of double standards.

• Under the pressure of the people, and by more and more fear of potential impacts on them, U.S. friends in the region will try to distance themselves from Washington or even pursue odd regional policies.

• Taking into consideration the previous points, the U.S. will lose influence rapidly in the region while Israel will make things worse for Washington and its interests in the Arab region

• A U.S. veto will serve Iran, Syria, and the Hezbollah axis, fortify their stance, and strengthen their influence in the Arab world again. They will go back to the old policy and talks of an “axis of defiance,” especially since these countries used to exploit the Palestinian issue for their own agendas and were trying, at the beginning of the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, to say that the matter is not about rights and freedoms or coups against dictatorships, but about a revolution against U.S. policy in the region.

Of course, this claim is not true. The revolutions aimed to topple dictatorships, but when things are settled, there is no doubt that the Palestinian issue will take the stage. The problem is that the U.S. veto and support for Israel at this stage of history will quickly shift and effectively direct the debate toward Palestine rather than rights, rule of law, democracy, and economic issues.

• A U.S. veto and support for Israel at this stage might undermine the quest to achieve democratic regimes in the Arab world. The shift of the debate from focusing on democracy to focusing on Palestine, Israel, and U.S. policies will feed populism rather than rational thinking, which will drive the region toward intolerance and chaos.

• In such an environment, it will become easy to expect the outbreak of war in the region. Israel has always resorted to evading its obligations through sparking wars, and Iran had always benefitted from such conditions to expand its influence in the Arab world. These things cannot be allowed at this stage during the difficult times this region is experiencing.

Ali Huseyin Bakir, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Amid spiraling Pakistani-US tensions, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani Sunday, Sept. 25, ordered Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to return home from New York at once shortly after she warned the US against "hot pursuit" of terrorists on Pakistani soil. A sense of crisis pervaded Islamabad as Pakistan's army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani held a "special" meeting of his top commanders "to review the security situation."

debkafile's military sources report Pakistan appears to be steeling itself for a possible clash with US troops

should "hot pursuit" takes place.
"The United States must not make someone a scapegoat if its goals are not achieved," the Foreign Minister Khar went on to say – apparently in response to the US message that if Islamabad fails to shut down the Haqqani network's bases, the Americans would.

Thursday, Sept. 22, the US Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen accused Pakistan's powerful ISI spy agency of supporting the Haqqani group which attacked the US embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul, capital of Afghanistan, on Sept. 13. His charge was based on the tapes obtained by US intelligence recording telephone conversations in the course of the attack in which the terrorists asked Inter-Service Intelligence officers in Pakistan for orders on how to proceed.
Pakistani intelligence is also accused to controlling the audacious suicide strike two days earlier on the Sayed Abad US Special Forces base which left 77 servicemen injured – the largest number of US casualties in a single attack in the past decade.

Friday, Sept. 23, US CENTCOM chief Gen. James Mattis arrived in Islamabad and confronted the Pakistani army chief with these charges. Gen. Kayani flatly denied any ties between the ISI and the Haqqani terrorists. He also warned that Pakistan would strike without mercy any acts of terror committed from Afghanistan by "miscreants."

The White House then issued a statement demanding that Pakistan break any link they have with terrorists.
The Americans bluntly accuse the ISI of funding and controlling the Haqqani Network and engineering its attacks on US military targets in Kabul to shake up security and wreck US political and military positions there ahead of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

Islamabad is seen in Washington as softening up the ground for pro-Pakistan Taliban factions to move in as Israel troops move out in order pre-empt the rising influence of Pakistan's traditional foe India which the ISI believes the United States is helping.
The Pakistani Prime Minister raised the stakes Saturday, Sept. 24 by dismissing US charges as
betraying "confusion and policy disarray within the US establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan." He therefore held the Obama administration and US military leaders no less responsible for the disarray in Afghanistan than its foes, the Taliban and the Haqqani network.
debkafile's military sources report that them current crisis brings to a climax ten years of mutual recriminations: The United States accuses Pakistan of playing a double role in the US war against Al Qaeda and Taliban – earning an annual $3 billion aid package from Washington while quietly nurturing Taliban and Pakistani terrorist groups, some linked to al Qaeda, for operations in Afghanistan and India.

Until May this year, the governments kept their voices down. Washington was concerned to maintain the important transit route supplies to US forces fighting in Afghanistan and so, when the argument became too strident, American secretaries of state or defense and CIA chiefs rushed over to Islamabad to hush things up and chart new paths for cooperation.
However, the US Special Forces raid on the Pakistani garrison town of Abbotville, to kill Osama Bin Laden, put an end to this on-again, off-again armistice. Washington refused to believe that he had enjoyed asylum there for five years without the knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence. Islamabad refused to take the American breach of their sovereignty without forewarning or the Pakistani military reacting lying down.

The acute differences burst out in the open. Pakistani public opinion, whose anti-Americanism is ingrained, refused to tolerate the false face of common interests and cooperation presented by Washington and Islamabad and insisted on a policy change: "The US can be friends but not masters," because a watchword.
The Gilani government can therefore no longer afford to be seen obeying Washington by cracking down on radical Islamic militias and terrorists operating in the country, whether Taliban, the Haqqani Network of Al Qaeda. Such measures would quickly be translated into burning American flags on Pakistani streets and demonstrations against the government.
The heads of that government no longer hold back their criticism of America's conduct of the Afghan war or their views that Washington has no chance of attaining a negotiated peace even with a part of the Taliban command.
Islamabad would prefer the Obama administration to pull his troops out of Afghanistan at once because, Pakistani leaders believe that the longer they stay, the greater the debacle. They have no intention of being associated with this downfall.
Gilani is not the only Pakistani leader terming US policy in Afghanistan as marked by "confusion and policy disarray."
 Friday, Sept. 23, the Washington Post carried this comment:  When President Obama told Americans in July that the “tide of war is receding” in Afghanistan, 3,100 soldiers from the 172nd brigade were just beginning to arrive in this rugged swath of the country — their first Afghan deployment coinciding almost exactly with the war’s ebb. The timing leaves [Col. Edward] Bohnemann to balance two separate directives that are often at odds with each other: to do all he can to defeat insurgents, while also preparing for an American departure by the end of 2014.

Neo-Osmanismus

Türken und Araber werden eins

Der türkische Ministerpräsident Erdogan betreibt Kulturpolitik als Machtdemonstration: Seine Vision eines neuen osmanischen Reiches nimmt Gestalt an.

Von Karen Krüger

Der türkische Ministerpräsident Tayyip Erdogan hat auf seiner Nahost-Reise die Sympathien vieler Araber auf seiner Seite

 

16. September 2011 2011-09-16 13:45:11

Auf seiner Nahost-Reise wurde der türkische Ministerpräsident Tayyip Erdogan bejubelt, und natürlich jubelte man darüber auch zu Hause, in der Türkei. Der Beifall wirkte mitunter, als sei der Anführer der Arabellion angereist. Dass Erdogan die Sympathien vieler Araber auf seiner Seite hat, mag an seiner antiisraelischen Rhetorik und Politik liegen. Aber auch daran, dass er aufforderte, politische Einigkeit zu demonstrieren. „Brüderlichkeit“ und „Gemeinschaft“ sind die bevorzugten Begriffe, mit denen der türkische Ministerpräsident sein Projekt vom muslimisch geprägten Mittelmeerraum gern umschreibt. Dass Erdogan, der bekannt ist für seinen Hang zum Neo-Osmanismus, dabei an die Einheit der Region während des Osmanischen Reiches erinnert, überrascht wenig: „Wir haben eine sehr lange gemeinsame Geschichte“, sagte er in Kairo, in Tunis und in Tripolis.

Der türkische Neo-Osmanismus, in dem sich islamische Überlegenheitssehnsucht mit patriotischer Ermutigung verbindet, beschränkt sich nicht allein auf die jüngsten außenpolitischen Bemühungen Ankaras. Seit Erdogans Partei, die AKP, die Regierung stellt, ist der Rückbezug auf die osmanische Zeit ein elementarer Teil der türkischen Kulturpolitik. Dabei interessiert sich Tayyip Erdogan, der im März mit absolutistischer Geste für den Abriss des an den Völkermord an den Armeniern erinnernde „Denkmal der Menschlichkeit“ in Kars sorgte (Denkmal in der Türkei: Mit der Abrissbirne gegen Versöhnung ), eigentlich herzlich wenig für Kultur. Ausnahmen bilden jene Projekte, die seiner neo-osmanischen Vision Ausdruck verleihen. So liebt der Ministerpräsident es, sich bei Auslandsreisen von einem Chor aus dem ostanatolischen Antakya begleiten zu lassen, der die Angehörigen mehrerer religiöser Minderheiten vereint – was freilich nicht bedeutet, dass man diesen in der Türkei auch mehr Rechte zugesteht. Staatlich gefördert, wird die osmanische Kultur und Praxis in der Türkei zu neuem Leben erweckt.

 

Die Medien prägen das neue Sendungsbewusstsein

Die Beispiele sind zahlreich: Seit Istanbul von der AKP regiert wird, gedenkt die Stadt jedes Jahr am 29. Mai mit einem Festakt der Eroberung Konstantinopels durch Mehmed II. 1453. Und als Istanbul im vergangenem Jahr europäische Kulturhauptstadt war, renovierte man mit dem dafür ausgewiesenen Budget vor allem osmanische Bauten. Istanbul wurde nicht mehr nur als Brücke zwischen Orient und Okzident inszeniert, sondern auch als Zentrum der osmanischen Zivilisation.

Besonders die Medien sind im staatlichen Auftrag vom neuen Sendungsbewusstsein geprägt – auch indirekt, und dass nicht nur in der Türkei. Seit dem Jahr 2009 kann auf dem Balkan, im Kaukasus und in Zentralasien der Kanal TRT-Avaz des staatlichen Fernsehens TRT empfangen werden. Er sendet in verschiedenen Turksprachen, Serien aus nationaler Produktion tragen türkische Untertitel. Auch in der arabischen Welt ist das staatliche türkische Fernsehen aktiv: TRT el-Turkiya erreicht vierundzwanzig Stunden am Tag auf Arabisch etwa 350 Millionen Menschen. „Türken und Araber sind wie die Finger einer einzigen Hand“, sagte Erdogan bei der Einweihung des Senders im vergangenen Jahr. Er sei ins Leben gerufen worden, „um unsere gemeinsame Sprache, unser gemeinsames Fenster zur Welt, unsere gemeinsame Leidenschaft zu werden“.

Schöne Worte über den Islam als Kultur des Friedens

Bisher können die arabischen Zuschauer vor allem Nachrichten sehen, außerdem die äußerst beliebten türkischen Daily-Soaps, deren Darstellungen von Liebe und Ehe sich an konservativ-muslimischen Wertvorstellungen orientieren. Großen Anklang finden auch die ultranationalistische, von Osmanen-Nostalgie geprägte Fernsehserie „Tal der Wölfe“ sowie deren Kinoadaption. In gewisser Weise spiegeln das Auftreten und die Worte Tayyip Erdogans auf seiner Nahost-Reise all jene Werte und Visionen wider, für die im Film die Hauptfigur, der türkische Geheimagent Polat Alemdar, steht, dessen Name auf Deutsch „Bannerträger“ bedeutet: dass die Türken und ein gemäßigter Islam Kräfte des Guten sind, die in der arabischen Welt und in Israel für Toleranz, Geborgenheit und Gerechtigkeit eintreten – sei es mit Gewalt.

Bei seiner Station in Kairo hat Tayyip Erdogan ein neues Yunus-Emre-Institut eröffnet. Die Institution ist vergleichbar mit dem deutschen Goethe-Institut und verfügt inzwischen über Zweigstellen in vierzehn Ländern. Die meisten zählen der Balkan und der arabische Raum, das erste wurde im Jahr 2009 in Sarajevo eingeweiht – in einer Stadt, die wie kaum eine andere das Türkentum symbolisiere, hieß es damals. Wie das so üblich ist, erinnerte Erdogan bei der Eröffnung in Kairo an den namensgebenden Sufi-Mystiker des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts. Mit dessen Werk kennt er sich aus: Sei es in Kairo, Köln oder Paris – in fast allen Reden Erdogans wird der große Dichter zitiert, um schöne Worte zu finden über den Islam als Kultur des Friedens. Den Gaza-Konflikt aber hat der türkische Ministerpräsident in den Arabischen Frühling getragen. Bis zu seiner Reise spielte dieser eine untergeordnete Rolle.

Text: F.A.Z.
Bildmaterial: AFP

Don’t Burn It, Read It

 

When people become aware of the dangers of Islamization, they tend to take an interest in the Koran. Rather than rely on what the media or Muslims tell them, they decide to examine Islam’s holy book for themselves, and turn to the internet for help.

Needless to say, the best resources on the Koran are on Islamic sites. You can find anything you want from the Koran, in any language. However, the presentation at such sites is from a Muslim point of view, and doesn’t generally point the reader to the wife-beating or Jew-killing or infidel-beheading verses.

That’s not true of TheQuran.com. It contains detailed easy-to-use analysis of the Koran, produced by Arabic-speaking scholars from both Christian and apostate backgrounds. It is one of the more useful reference sites on the subject that I’ve come across: you can look up verses by topic, or you can search on keywords, or simply browse the contents. It also has a series of articles on particular suras and verses of interest.

As the main page says, it is “…a site for all things related to The Quran. This is the first site of its kind to provide a unique interpretation of The Quran unclouded by the myths and legends that surround Islamic heritage. TheQuran.com is the perfect site for anyone with the desire to study The Quran beyond the boundaries drawn by interpreters who are unwilling to contradict traditional Islamic teaching and refused to subject The Quran to literary and scientific critique, either due to their Islamic faith or weakness in understanding the Arabic language of the Quran.”

Also:

 

A new section has been added to this site to allow the visitor to view all the verses from the Quran relating to specific topics such as jihad, Christians, Jews, women, terrorism and others. You can view the list in different languages and translations.

On this site all registered users have the ability to comment on every abrogation, comparative reading, critical analysis and article. Registration is free.

Visit the Read section to read the Quran in multiple languages and view the commentary and analysis.

[…]

At the TheQuran.com you can:

 

• Examine many of the historical variant readings of the Quran
• Read The Quran more clearly and accurately
• See abrogated verses alongside explanations within the text.
• Learn more about the history of the Quran.
• Examine the current sequence of the Quranic chapters in comparison to other historical codices.
• Research many of the grammatical, historical, and scientific errors in the Quran.
• Examine a variety of internal contradictions within the Quran.
• Enrich your knowledge concerning the teaching of the Quran in areas such as; status of women; treatment of people of other faith; Jihad; and much more.

Plus, you will find many beneficial articles, resources and links to material that will increase your understanding of The Quran. Our goal is to make The Quran more easily accessible and understood while basing all commentary on authoritative Islamic sources.

In the future, visitors will be able to search for specific subjects and keywords within the text and participate in discussion boards! Due to ongoing scientific development and literary dialogue the content of our site will be continually updated with the latest articles and discussions related to The Quran. We welcome comments and suggestions from our visitors as we strive to make this site as user-friendly as possible.

The site’s owners are also promoting their book, The Qur’an Dilemma:

A book of terror or a book of peace? An inspired text or a political agenda? How is one to know the truth about the Qur’an? Where does one even begin? How can an English speaker ever hope to wade through the history, the translations, the sects, and the commentaries to begin making sense of the issues?

During the last decade, interest in Islam and the teachings of the Qur’an has grown globally. In order to allow Westerners to investigate the truth about Islam, this research text was translated from Arabic to give English speaking readers the opportunity to see the Qur’an with clear lenses that are not fogged by propaganda or missionary zeal. This book provides the background of the Qur’an in an objective manner. It also presents the text of the Qur’an with parallel commentary, addressing important issues that Muslim scholars have wrestled with throughout the centuries, shedding light on their attempts to solve them and giving a rounded view of the various schools of thought.

The critical approach in this book is inspired by the courageous tradition of those who have dared to analyze the Qur’an throughout history, while also incorporating the contemporary intellectual productions available in Arabic and foreign sources. The discoveries made through these scholarly critical methods are directed to non-Muslims and Muslims equally:

To non-Muslims who want to unravel the mysteries of Islam, this book presents information that Islamic resources rarely disclose—to allow those who seek the truth to comprehend the full picture with all its outlines, colors, and dimensions.

To Muslims who seek genuine choices far from the culture of “indoctrination,” this book opens a world of understanding to them, so that they can decide for themselves their intellectual and spiritual paths.

The Quran Dilemma (Volume One) — available now both in English and in Arabic — covers the first nine suras (chapters) of the Quran. The remaining suras will be covered in Volume Two, due for release in 2011. Articles and commentary found throughout this masterfully executed book — which explain and analyze each sura — are based on authoritative Islamic sources.

I haven’t really begun to access all the resources at TheQuran.com. I recommend that readers visit the site, and discover for themselves what else can be found there.

 

Hat tip: Russkiy.